Introduction

Welcome to NCC Group's monthly Cyber Threat Intelligence Report, bringing you exclusive insight into the latest Threat Intelligence, updates on recent and emerging advances in the threat landscape and a deep understanding of the latest Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) of threat actors.

Let us keep watch over the cyber and geopolitical landscape so you don’t have to.

Take a look at our cyber threat intelligence [webpage](#) to view all our previous reports and subscribe to our monthly highlights webinar.
Ransomware Tracking

We are continuing to track ransomware groups operating the hack and leak double extortion tactic, this is achieved by actively monitoring the leak sites used by each ransomware group and scraping victim details as they are released.

By recording this data and classifying the victims by sector, we are able to derive additional insights such as, which sectors are being targeted this month, and how do these insights compare to previous months?

MARCH ATTACKS

459

MONTH ON MONTH

+91%
Analyst Comments

In our previous Threat Pulse, NCC Group touched upon the fact that we had seen the highest number of ransomware hack & leak cases for both January and February in the past 3 years, and this observation has continued into March. In fact, March’s ransomware victim numbers are the highest of any month in the past three years, highlighting an enormous surge as visualised in Figure 1. February to March 2023 exhibited a 91% increase from 240 attacks to 459; this also illustrates a 62% increase, year-on-year, when compared to March 2022.

NCC Group have assessed that the cause of this dramatic incline is likely associated with the highly publicised GoAnywhere MFT vulnerability being exploited across the threat landscape. CL0P, who were the most active threat actor in March, are known to have widely exploited this vulnerability, resulting in a huge soar in their victim numbers. CL0Ps’ recent surge in activity and their modus operandi will be discussed in depth in the Threat Spotlight of this report.

Figure 1 - Global Ransomware Attacks by Month
The most targeted sector in March 2023 was Industrials with a significant 147 attacks out of 459, accounting for 32% of the total. In terms of total figures, this is an increase of 67 attacks (84% increase) but a miniscule proportional decrease of 1%, showing that irrespective of the dramatic increase of victims this month, the relative targeting remains largely similar. This will likely continue to be the case for the majority of 2023 for the same reasons that we have mentioned previously; Industrials contains possibly the widest variety of industries that provide threat actors with opportunities to extort PII/IP, and cause operational disruption to incentivise ransom payments.
Clop's successful exploitation of the GoAnywhere vulnerability saw the threat group rise to first place on the leader board, a position they have never held. This shift saw Lockbit displaced to second most prominent threat actor, a decline we have not observed since Lockbit was surpassed by the Royal and Cuba ransomware strains in November 2022. Given Lockbit's persistent success as a highly relentless ransomware group, supported by an affiliate model that affords them global reach, Clop's position could be considered a rather insurmountable feat. That said, we suspect that their rise in attacks will see results manifest only in the short-term, as organisations adopt patches against GoAnywhere and Lockbit 3.0 reclaims their place. The group's success nonetheless provides a critical reminder of threat actor exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities at pace, their associated risks, and the importance of patching ASAP.
Regions

Alongside the overall rise in cases in March, the weighting of targeting within each region has remained mostly consistent with some minor differences. North America was the most targeted region with 221 cases out of the total 459 (48%), this was followed by Europe with 126 (28%), and Asia with 59 (13%). The remaining regions have remained mostly consistent with their positions in February with just slight 1% decreases in proportional targeting across the board. Note that one of these incidents falls under “TA Dispute” which has been mentioned in the Threat Actors section just prior.

In terms of total figures, cases in North America have increased by 108 (96%) from February to March 2023, which is a proportional increase of just 1%, again highlighting the targeting consistency. Europe's total figures have increased by 70 cases (125%), which is a more noticeable proportional increase of 5%, perhaps implying an increased focus on European countries in March. Finally, Asia's attack numbers have increased by 24 cases (69%) which is a proportional decrease of 2%. Therefore, NCC Group as always suggest that organisations residing all regions monitor and strengthen their cyber defences where possible, but this is particularly pertinent for North America and Europe.

Figure 12 - Regional Analysis March 2023
Threat Spotlight: Cl0p

Who are Cl0p?

Cl0p is a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) provider, ransomware threat group, and a malware family as well – likely evolved from the CryptoMix ransomware family. Discovered only in February 2019, the Russian-speaking group has not been on the cybercrime scene for as long as other more established actors, and yet has managed to significantly evolve their sophistication and capability levels, as well as capture the attention of those within the security industry and mainstream media alike.

What is GoAnywhere?

The GoAnywhere Managed File Transfer (MFT) system is one used by over 3,000 organisations, mostly within the United States. The majority of organisations utilising this package have more than 1,000 employees, with many having more than 10,000. Companies of this size are often targeted as part of big game hunting campaigns, and this is no exception; most of the known victims had revenues of over $1B and were situated in sectors like government departments, healthcare, energy, tech, and the financial sector.

To conduct this campaign, Cl0p exploited CVE-2023-0669 to execute a cross-site request forgery (CSRF). Instead of the typical practice of downloading a license file from a server and uploading it to a device, Fortra made the process more transparent by delivering the license to a user through the administrator's browser. However, this gives the user a smoother experience; there is no protection against CSRF attempts. Additionally, no authentication is required to exploit this issue, as no cookies are required to undertake the license transfer. GoAnywhere MFT servers often sit on a network perimeter, with the file transfer ports publicly exposed. This makes them increasingly attractive targets to malicious actors, as they can be exploited to steal sensitive data directly from the target, as well as pivoting to an organisation's internal network.

Currently, some of the victims identified from the campaign include: the City of Toronto, Virgin Red, UK Pension Protection Fund, Procter & Gamble, Saks Fifth Avenue, Hitachi Energy, and Rio Tinto. A timeline of the attacks is illustrated below:

**February 1st**

- GoAnywhere send an advisory to users of their product.

**February 2nd**

- Brian Krebs registers to GoAnywhere in order to gain authentication to view advisory, publishes it on his Mastodon account.
February 3rd
- Story picked up by cyber news outlets and vendors
- Fortra advises the Web Client interface is not exploitable
- Fortra advisory for customers to review admin users and monitor for suspicious ones
  - Especially if users are created by system indicating follow-on attacker behaviour

February 6th
- Proof of exploit released

February 7th
- CVE-2023-0669 assigned
- Patch 7.1.2 released

February 9th
- Fortra announces some MFTaaS instances were also compromised
  - “We have determined that an unauthorized party accessed the systems via a previously unknown exploit and created unauthorized user account.”

February 10th
- Shodan shows 1K+ GoAnywhere instances exposed online, but only 135 on ports 8000 and 8001 used by the vulnerable admin console

March 10th
- Cl0p contacted BleepingComputer stating they’d stolen data from 130+ organisations over a ten-day period
  - They claimed they had the ability to move laterally within victim networks yet decided not to deploy ransomware, instead limiting themselves to stealing data directly from MFT servers
  - They did not provide any proof of these claims

March 29th
- Shodan indicates 94 instances on port 8000 and 8001 are still open
Importantly, this is not the first time Cl0p has mass-hacked a vast number of large organisations by exploiting a vulnerability in a third-party product. The Accellion attacks outlined above, occurring in late 2020 and early 2021, are a great example of this. Using similar tactics to attack Accellion’s legacy File Transfer Appliance (FTA) with a combination of new web shells and zero-day vulnerabilities to exploit, they managed to amass more than 100 victims. This time, it was Fortra’s GoAnywhere MFT tool and CVE-2023-0669, which were exploited. The targeting of multiple organisations and the announcement of multiple victims in quick succession is something of an identifier for Cl0p, which distinguishes them from other ransomware operators.

Notably, as Cl0p is a RaaS provider, a number of affiliates also exploit the ransomware strain in their attacks. Cl0p have been linked to other actors before, most notably TA505 and FIN11, and this recent campaign against the GoAnywhere MFT has been attributed to actors other than Cl0p themselves. Additionally, Huntress linked the use of the malware family Truebot which has been previously associated with another Russian-speaking threat group, Silence. Silence have also been linked in the past with TA505, who are also being discussed as responsible for this latest spate of attacks.
Securing Your Systems: How do I Protect Myself?

Some simple mitigations organisations can adopt to prevent against this threat include:

• Limit exposure on ports 8000 and 8001; these are the ports where the GoAnywhere MFT admin panel is situated.
• Login to your account and follow the steps outlined in the GoAnywhere security advisory.
• Install patch 7.1.2
• Review admin user accounts for suspicious activity, with a special focus on accounts created by system, suspicious or atypical timing of account creation, or disabled super users creating multiple accounts.
• Contact GoAnywhere MFT support directly via portal, email, or phone to receive additional assistance.

Further advice on mitigating ransomware specifically, as well as new emerging threats more generally includes:

• Know your estate: knowing what systems are in use and how they are configured makes the task of knowing whether a recently announced vulnerability has the ability to impact your organisation or not.
• Patch! Patch! Patch: New vulnerabilities are exposed regularly and it can be difficult to keep up. However, a years-old vulnerability on a system which has not been patched serves only to make an attacker's life easier.
• Block common forms of entry: Create a plan for how to quickly disable at-risk systems like VPNs or RDP, or look into endpoint security packages to detect exploits and malware before they are utilised by attackers.
• Create backups: backup’s stored offline and offsite are beyond the reach of attackers and can serve to get an organisation back on its feet with minimal downtime in the event of falling victim to a ransomware attack.

Do not get attacked twice: Attackers can target organisations more than once. If they see that a vulnerability remains unpatched, or that a security flaw which previously assisted their attacks has not yet been remedied, they may return to the same victim for follow-up attacks. Once the outbreak is isolated and the first attack is successfully stopped, every trace of their intrusion, malware, tools, methods of entry, must be removed, assessed, and acted upon to avoid being attacked again.
Our experts are here to help you every step of the way. Contact us today to learn more about cyber security.

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